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Abstract 
The liberalization of the natural gas industry has been based on the idea that infrastructure may be 
used by different gas owners. Different players using the same resources can give raise to ‘commons 
dilemmas’, which are defined by a conflict between individual rationality and group rationality. To 
avoid 'commons' inefficiencies, solutions are to establish rules that constrain the players’ use of the 
network. In order to manage efficiently these situations, 'common pool' agreements can be established 
either through external authority or by the users themselves. In gas industries both can be found in 
practice. Public gas regulators can play the role of external authority in some countries, whereas in 
some other, the infrastructure rules are designed and implemented by the users themselves through 
players’ agreements. Based on a simple game theoretical model, we compare the economics properties 
of the ‘EU common carriage’ and the ‘US contract carriage’ systems in term of static and dynamic 
efficiency. Our analysis allows us to identify missing economic signals in the EU regulatory 
framework both for static and dynamic efficiency. 
Keywords 
Common-pool resources, gas network use, property rights, carriage system 
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1. Introduction 
Gas industries assets are characterized by strong site (spatial and temporal) specificity. Moreover, gas 
and power has also strong physical specificity. This is a source of severe transactions costs. Hence, 
Williamson (1979), one expects a high level of vertical integration among users and pipeline owners, 
Mulherin (1986) and Joskow (1987). In order to allow market arrangements to coordinate the industry, 
it is necessary to create a tradable commodity. So market designs for gas industries begin with the 
some standardization of the commodity.  
One of the key elements to reduce the asset specificity of energy industries, and hence the costs of 
trading energy in markets, is the transmission infrastructure. Once some standards for physical 
characteristics are set, transmission infrastructures connect several locations and times of delivery, 
enlarging the trading space. This reduces the specificity of gas and power, making market 
arrangements easier. But at the same time, network infrastructures are dedicated assets. So in order to 
benefit from network infrastructures to reduce gas commodity specificity, one needs to decide how to 
coordinate the use and investment in the network. This paper tackles the problem of analyzing the 
available choices to design the regulation intended to guide the transactions associated with network 
resources allocation and investment. Under the liberalization frame, complete vertical integration is 
forbidden: pipeline users and pipeline operators (and owners) must be unbundled, Doane & Spulber 
(1994). This rule was established to decrease entry barriers. As gas transmission systems are dedicated 
assets with high capital cost, they should be opened to as many shippers as possible.  
There is an extensive bibliography identifying the asset specificities of the gas transmission system. 
The new institutional economics has shown the need for long-term contracts to decrease the 
transaction costs of the coordination between gas commodity and the pipelines Crocker & Masten 
(1988), Crocker & Masten (1985), Mulherin (1986), Hubbard & Weiner (1991), Creti & Villeneuve 
(2004), von Hirschhausen & Neumann (2008), Glachant & Hallack (2009). This literature focuses on 
the characteristics of long-term contracts and their role in guaranteeing the trade among players.  
Our paper adds a new layer of analysis. We enter into the contract characteristics themselves in 
order to analyze the kind of service that is actually offered. Unbundling, stated as a prerequisite for gas 
industry liberalization, makes network infrastructure a common resource. We show in this paper that 
the different mechanisms defining the rules of gas network use strongly impact the services offered 
and the investment incentives scheme. In this paper we argue that gas industry is a nice playing field 
for a common-pool resource theory application. This approach allows the analysis of the players’ 
incentives of using common resources and to invest in common resources, Ostrom, Gardner & Walker 
(1994). This approach complements the transaction costs approach as it discuss the efficiency of the 
allocation of a resource that is not completely private neither public. In other words, we will analyze 
the coordination mechanisms taking into account the different partial rights that players may have in a 
common pool, Ostrom (2005) and Bergstrom (2010).  
To do so, it will make use of the general framework proposed by Ostrom, Gardner & Walker 
(1994) and Ostrom (2005), with the aim to assess the economic incentives and distortions that gas 
transport open access rules may imply. The classification proposed in Ostrom (1994) builds on the 
description of economic goods based on two fundamental attributes developed by Samuelson (1954) 
and Musgrave (1959). On the one hand, goods can be classified regarding to the associated difficulty 
in excluding individuals from benefiting from the service flow; this first property is called 
excludability, which was introduced by Musgrave (1959). On the other hand, considering that goods 
behave differently depending on whether the consumption of the good by any individual reduces the 
possible consumption of the others; this second property is called subtractability
1
. The gas transport 
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network is an infrastructure used by a set of economic players (the shippers) where Individuals, thus, 
consume the flow of services produced by network facilities, rather than directly consuming the 
facilities themselves, Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne (1993). In order to coordinate these transactions 
without vertical integration, two different (and even opposite) systems were established in the EU and 
in the US, Makholm (2006). In Europe natural gas pipelines have been regulated as national (or 
regional) networks through a set of codes applied to any user. In the US, each pipeline defines its 
services separately and based on the negotiation with the users, Vazquez, Hallack & Glachant (2012). 
Most of the following analysis will be devoted to discussing the pros and cons of network use 
coordination in EU and US.  
The paper is structured has follow: section 0 discusses the common pool nature of the natural gas 
transmission systems. An infrastructure been used by different players, which the use of one impact 
the available capacity for the others players. Moreover, the services offered subtract different amounts 
of available capacity. The use of different services impacts differently on the total use of the network.  
Section 0 builds a series of illustrations based on simple games. The network can be used to provide 
flexible and/or flat services. So we suppose possible rules for service allocation. We show that the 
expected output changes according of the rules established. Moreover, we analyze games representing 
the impact of defining ex-ante rules (by a third party), and of defining rules according to players 
preferences (negotiation between shippers and pipelines).  
Section 0 discusses in depth the different implementation of network rules. Such implementations 
are called carriage systems. We show that the definition of property rights implied by the carriage 
systems results in whether the system defines ex-ante rules or rules based on players’ negotiation. We 
show that carriage systems adopted by EU and USA are different in this regard, and consequently the 
rules of network use are different.  
Section 0 makes a step further with the study of how these different mechanisms to define rules 
actually impact on investment decisions. The mechanism of defining rules (the carriage system) 
impacts on the rules of infrastructure use. But infrastructure use impacts on investment. As a result, we 
show that the mechanism that defines the rules of use of a common infrastructure actually impacts on 
the dynamics of investment. Moreover, the mechanism chosen also affects the incentives for service 
innovation.  
The last section is dedicated to conclusions and the underlining about open questions. We 
especially discuss about the impact of the common resources theory may have to the traditional 
approach of network industries regulation by adding a new level of analysis: the rules of common 
pools’ use.  
2. Gas transmission systems as common pool resources  
The two main characteristics that motivate our analysis are the common-pool nature of networks in a 
market environment and the heterogeneity of services that they may offer. In this section, we first 
describe the services that the network may offer, and then we characterize the common-pool nature of 
the infrastructure.  
2.1 Services heterogeneity  
Natural gas pipelines are able to offer at least three kinds of services, which are: a) transport of gas 
between two points in a determined point in time; b) transport between two regions (being each region 
a set of points) in determined point in time; c) transport and storage of gas (different timing between 
the moment of injection and withdrawal of gas), Hallack (2011).  
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a) Point-to-point transport  
The simplest way to think of gas transmission is considering the injection of gas in point A and the 
withdrawal of gas in point B. The gas is transported by the pressure differential between point A and 
point B. Thus, by increasing pressure in point A, the gas flows to point B where it is delivered. It is a 
point-to-point transmission service.  
 
A                                                                  B 
b) Region-to-region transport  
When a set of pipelines is considered, it is possible to offer a service giving the right to transport from 
A to B, and also the right to transport from A to C, and from A to D.  
 
A                                                                   B 
 
                                                       C 
 
                                    D 
c) Line-pack storage 
The combination of pipeline and compressor may allow gas storage. The pressure differential between 
two points makes the gas flow. But on the other hand, the increase of pressure in the total system (by 
decreasing pressure differentials) actually stores gas
2
.  
The transmission services between regions (b) and the use of the line-pack storage (c) are actually 
the offer of flexibility services, both time and spatial flexibility, Vazquez & Hallack (2012). We will 
call such services flexible transmission services. The point-to-point services (a) will be called flat 
transmission services. 
2.2 Services subtractability 
Common-pool resources are characterized on the one hand by the relatively high difficulty in 
excluding potential beneficiaries of networks services, and on the other by the relatively high 
subtractability of use. The use of a pipeline by any player subtracts the resources available for the 
others players. Thus, the pipeline services are subtractible services.  
Common-pool resources may be subject of prisoner’s dilemmas. To avoid the inefficiencies 
associated with prisoner’s dilemmas, it is necessary to establish some rules for the use of the resource. 
For instance, one the basic rules to be implemented is to respect the security limits of the pipeline. The 
transmission system needs to respect pressures limits and thus there are a limited number of players 
that can use the resource in the same time. Moreover, as resources are limited, it is necessary to define 
who has the right to use it.  
But the physical system may deliver different service and the different services impact differently 
in the total available resources. The use of flexible services decreases the availability of flat services
3
. 
In that view, flexible services subtract network capacity in a different manner than flat services. The 
exact value depends on the amount of flexibility: temporal flexibility (hourly, daily, weekly...) and 
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spatial flexibility (the size of the region where the gas can be injected and withdrawn). Moreover, the 
relation between the cost of flexible and flat transmission services depends on physical characteristics 
of the network components: compressor stations (mechanical characteristics, position and power...) 
and pipelines (size, diameter, material, thickness...), Glachant & Hallack (2010). 
Therefore, in addition to the rules related to the common resource, it is necessary to define the rules 
aimed at coordinating the amount of flexible and flat services that will be offered by the network. As 
the subtractability of different network services is not homogeneous, there is a need for additional 
rules to coordinate such decisions. We will show in the next section, by means of simple games, that 
defining such set of rules is not straightforward.  
3. Different uses of the gas transmission resource: analyzing games outputs  
In this section we show how rules of network use impact on the final output, and how contracts may 
be used to minimize the impact of such rules on users’ choices. Following the methodology of 
analyzing simple games we will show how the rules of transmission system allocation can generate 
incentives for diverse outputs, Ostrom, Gardner & Walker (1994). 
To do so, we will consider a simple representation of the technical decisions associated with the 
operation of pipelines. Specifically, we will consider only two kinds of services: flexible and flat use. 
In that view, we focus on how to decide if available resources are devoted to provide flexible or flat 
services. Then, we step by step introduce games structures witch allow us in the following section (4) 
to analyze the EU and US carriage systems.  
3.1 Potential prisoner’s dilemmas when networks offer different products 
The first step of our reasoning is to put forward a simple example of commons dilemma. Consider a 
simplified model of a gas network that two players can use. Both players obtain a value for the flat use 
of network  and a value for the flexible use of the network . Players decide on two 
possible options: using 2MW of flat network capacity, or using 1MW of flat capacity plus 1MW of 
flexible capacity.  
Game 1 
Let us assume first that network capacity is 4MW regardless the combination of flat and flexible use 
of the network. For the same transmission system, the amount of available flex capacity is equivalent 
of the amount of flat capacity. 
Table 1: First Game Illustration  
Demand of network Network capacity Strategic form of the game 
4 Flat 4  2 Flat 1 Flat – 1 Flex 
3 Flat - 1 Flex 4 2 Flat (12,12) (12,16) 
2 Flat – 2 Flex 4 1 Flat – 1 Flex (16,12) (16,16) 
 
The grey box of Table 1 represents the equilibrium of the game. In this case, there is no commons’ 
dilemma regarding the rules of resource allocation. But the result is based on considering that the 
services offered by the transmission network are equivalent for the system (the use of flexible capacity 
subtracts the same amount of the available capacity than flat capacity). It means that, actually, whether 
the use is flexible or flat is irrelevant, as they affect the others players the same way.  
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Game 2 
Nevertheless, in practice, flexible capacity subtracts more from the available amount than flat 
capacity. Hence, the impact of flexible demand for network capacity is different of the impact of flat 
demand. Flexible services demand more capacity from the total capacity of the system than flat 
services. To illustrate this, consider the following modification of the initial game: the capacity of the 
network, if both players choose to use it flat, is 4MW. If one player chooses flexible use, the flat 
capacity is 2MW and the flexible capacity is 1MW. If both players use the network flexibly, the flat 
capacity is zero and the flexible capacity is 2MW. It means that the use of flex capacity (1MW) leaves 
less available flat capacity for further allocation than the use of flat capacity (1MW)
4
.  
Capacity allocation 1 
If the demand for network is higher than its capacity, the rules for allocating network capacity are 
the following: a) the capacity is allocated equally among users and b) the flex capacity is 
allocated first (there is priority for flex capacity before the allocation of any flat capacity). 
Table 2: Second Game Illustration  
Demand of network Network capacity Strategic form of the game 
4 Flat 4 Flat  2 Flat 1 Flat – 1 Flex 
3 Flat - 1 Flex 2 Flat – 1 Flex 2 Flat (12,12) (6,16) 
2 Flat – 2 Flex 2 Flex 1 Flat – 1 Flex (16,6) (10,10) 
 
In this second game, the equilibrium is represented by the grey box in Table 2. We observe a prisoner's 
dilemma because players have to choose between more capacity or more valued capacity. If the other 
player chooses valuable capacity, the amount of your own capacity is restricted. The use of the rules 
allocating capacity to both shippers equivalently and giving priority to flexible capacity results in 
prisoners’ dilemmas outputs. 
But it is possible to consider a different allocation rule.  
Capacity allocation 2 
If the demand for network is higher than its capacity, the rules for allocating network capacity are 
the following: a) the capacity is allocated equally among users and b) the flat capacity allocated 
first (there is priority for flat capacity allocation before the allocation of any flex capacity). 
Table 3: Third Game Illustration  
Demand of network Network capacity Strategic form of the game 
4 Flat 4 Flat  2 Flat 1 Flat – 1 Flex 
3 Flat - 1 Flex 3 Flat – 0.5 Flex 2 Flat (12,12) (12,11) 
2 Flat – 2 Flex 2 Flat - 1 Flex 1 Flat – 1 Flex (11,12) (11,11) 
 
In this game, the equilibrium is represented by the grey box of Table 3. We observe that the previous 
dilemma is now solved by giving priority to the allocation of flat capacity. 
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Lessons that may be drawn from the examples 
Looking back on these three examples we observe that the game output depends a) on the 
characteristics of the services offered and b) on the allocation rule. The game outputs change 
depending whether the impact of services in the system is equivalent or not. In the former case, in case 
of excess of demand, the capacity is used equivalently by the two kinds of services. However, if the 
use of a unit of flexible service impact differently on the system, it raises the question of how to 
allocate capacity in case of restrictions. We show that if flex services (more valuable and more costly) 
or flat services (less valuable and less costly) have priority in the use of the system, we generate 
different outputs. 
In the first case, where flexibility has priority, the game structure is the one corresponding to the 
prisoners’ dilemma. In the second one, however, changing the rule and given priority for flat capacity, 
the dilemma disappears. The essential requirement for doing so is to know that flat capacity, even with 
lower value, is the efficient assignment, because choosing flexible capacity implies a too costly 
reduction in the transmission capacity. Therefore, the rules of network use (given access priority to 
one or another kind of capacity) play a central role to define the efficient output. Anyway, it may be 
possible for the pipeline operator of the previous examples, to anticipate that flat capacity is more 
efficient, and thus the process of capacity calculation could do the coordination. We show below that 
this is not the case in presence of players’ heterogeneity. 
3.2 Including players’ heterogeneity in the game 
The simple examples developed above show that the definition of the rules allocating network services 
may be central to avoid dilemmas in the choice of network use, when the services offered have 
different costs for the system. We may assume that some fixed mechanism (priority for flat capacity, 
in the example above) is able to allocate common resources among players, taking into account their 
preferences and the system costs. However, in the presence of players’ heterogeneity, this might not be 
straightforward. Consider a simplified model of a gas network that two players can use. However, the 
two players have different preferences (thus give different value) for flexible and flat capacity. The 
first player obtain a value for the flat use of network  and for the flexible capacity 
. The second player obtain a value for flat capacity  and for flex capacity 
.  
Let us consider the two options for capacity allocation of the previous section. 
Capacity allocation 1 
If the demand for network is higher than its capacity, the rules for allocating network capacity are 
the following: a) the capacity is allocated equally among users and b) the flex capacity is 
allocated first (there is priority for flex capacity before the allocation of any flat capacity). 
Table 4: Heterogeneous players: Game 1 
Demand of network Network capacity Strategic form of the game 
4 Flat 4 Flat  2 Flat 1 Flat – 1 Flex 
3 Flat - 1 Flex 2 Flat – 1 Flex 2 Flat (12,12) (6,36) 
2 Flat – 2 Flex 2 Flex 1 Flat – 1 Flex (16,6) (10,30) 
Capacity allocation 2 
If the demand for network is higher than its capacity, the rules for allocating network capacity 
are the following: a) the capacity is allocated equally among users and b) the flat capacity 
allocated first (there is priority for flat capacity allocation before the allocation of any flex 
capacity). 
The impact of who decides the rules for network use 
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Table 5: Heterogeneous players: Game 2  
Demand of network Network capacity Strategic form of the game 
4 Flat 4 Flat  2 Flat 1 Flat – 1 Flex 
3 Flat - 1 Flex 3 Flat – 0.5 Flex 2 Flat (12,12) (12,21) 
2 Flat – 2 Flex 2 Flat - 1 Flex 1 Flat – 1 Flex (11,12) (11,21) 
First of all, the use of the network depends on the rules of network use. But in this case, contrary to the 
first examples, we are not facing only a prisoner’s dilemma. Both equilibria are maximizing the 
welfare of the corresponding game. What these examples show is that the pipeline operator, in the 
process of calculating the capacity, is inducing different games. Moreover, the distribution of the 
social welfare is not the same in both allocation schemes.  
The conclusion that can be drawn for the games with heterogeneous users is that there is one 
solution for capacity that makes the flat player to end up better off than in the other solution. 
Therefore, the initial mechanism considered to allocate capacity, characterized by a pipeline operator 
using the capacity calculation to coordinate the use of the pipeline, cannot be done efficiently in the 
case of heterogeneity. The capacity calculation process defines the game that network users will be 
playing, and thus the rules for network use affect the use of the network.  
3.3 Adding negotiation to reveal preferences 
Consider a case where the final capacity calculation (of flat and flexible services) takes into account 
the players preferences. For this, we may allow players to sign contracts without any ‘a priori’ 
restriction on services. The pipeline operator is not informed about the future use of the pipeline, so 
the solution is to create the mechanisms for players to reveal their preferences. Hence, players should 
negotiate (and commit) before the capacity calculation takes place. It is necessary to have mechanisms 
allowing communication in the contracting process. Consider that a pipeline operator is trying to 
allocate pipeline capacity efficiently. To do so, some bidding mechanism may be established in order 
to allow players to reveal the kind of service they need and how much they are willing to pay for them. 
This negotiation may be done through bilateral contracts or through auction-like processes. In this 
game we introduce the negotiation process by bilateral contracts. To do so, there are two possible 
contracting options. Both contracts involve implicit commitment of the pipeline operator.  
The first contract says that player 1 commits to choose 2Flat and the capacity will be that of the 
first equilibrium. As she knows that player 2 will try to induce the second equilibrium, she commits to 
an additional payment. Such payment is so that player 1 still prefers the first equilibrium, so if both 
players sign this contract player 1 pays one euro to player 2. 
The second contract says that player 2 commits to choose 1Flat-1Flex and the capacity will be that 
of the second equilibrium. As she knows that player 1 prefers the first equilibrium, she specifies an 
additional payment of 3 in the case that both players sign the contract.  
Finally, if players do not agree in a contract, the pipeline operator chooses the most valued of the 
previous equilibria. In this instance, the pipeline operator chooses the second equilibria. 
Michelle Hallack and Miguel Vazquez 
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Table 6: The role of negotiation  
Strategic form of the game 
 Contract 1 Contract 2 
Contract 1 (11,22) (6,36) 
Contract 2 (16,6) (13,27) 
This last example shows that, if players were able to negotiate their capacity, they would be able to 
find a better solution, which allows them to maximize the welfare through the redistribution gains
5
. 
The first assumption of our analysis is that different players may use the transmission system. 
However, they need to follow some rules. These rules can be defined ex-ante (through a sharing rule 
about what kind of service has priority). But we showed in this section that the rules might be 
implemented by a system of contracts. This implies a definition of the rules for network use, so the 
pipeline operator is not involved in the definition of the game.  
We have shown using simple games that the decision-making process to offer network services 
defines the game that network users are playing. Consequently, the definition of the network services 
offered plays a key role in the allocation of network resources. In the following section, we will 
analyze the mechanisms that are defining the rules for network use in practice according to the kind of 
carriage system used in EU and in the US.  
4. Mechanisms defining the rules for the use of gas transmission infrastructure: 
the carriage systems 
From this paper’s point of view, we analyze how the rules delimitating the services offered by the gas 
infrastructure is defined. In this section, our aim is to compare the current situation in the EU systems 
and in the US systems. The logic for this is that they may be considered extreme cases of carriage 
systems in a liberalized industry facing a common pool resource problem: more precisely, EU scheme 
is using the game structure explained in table 4 and 5 (the rules for capacity allocation are defined ‘ex 
ante’ by a third part), whereas the US game structure is corresponding to the game in table 6 (the rules 
defined by negotiation among players).  
4.1 Mechanisms, property rights and decision-makers 
To understand the consequences of different carriage systems in the use of network resources, it is 
useful to analyze them from the standpoint of property rights. In fact, in common pool resources, the 
separation between the different property rights allows understanding how the liberalization process 
changed the rights of pipelines (they unbundled the infrastructure rights, Kotlowski (2007) . 
Furthermore, it allows understanding how different combination of rights may give different economic 
incentives, Ostrom & Hess (2007). 
“Property rights define actions that individuals can take in relation to other individuals regarding 
some ‘thing’ if one individual has a right, someone else has a commensurate duty to observe that 
right. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify five property rights that are most relevant for the use 
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of the common-pool resources, including access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and 
alienation” (Ostrom, 2002, page 16). 
Table 7: Set of Goods Property Rights 
Access The right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy nonsubtractive benefits 
Withdrawal The right to obtain resources units or products of a resource system 
Management The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resources by making 
improvements 
Exclusion The right to determine who will have the access right, and how the right may be 
transferred 
Alienation6 The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights 
Source: Author elaboration, based Ostrom (2005). 
Comparing the gas network property rights under common and contract carriage, exclusion and 
alienation rights are weak in both carriage systems. In a liberalized market, the network itself is 
considerably regulated, even if the rights to use the infrastructures (offering services or managing 
flows) are held to some extent by pipelines and shippers.  
Regarding access rights, the definition of open access has become quite confuse in the economic 
literature Ostrom & Hess (2007). To clarify it, one might consider that common pool resources are 
made up of the resource system (the facility) and the flow of resources units or benefits from the 
system (the service allocation). Open access rights mean the right to access the facility, but they do not 
mean the right to acquire any service. The right to use a service is the withdrawal right, the withdrawal 
of units from the set of units. Thus, the right of withdrawal (the right to use network services), is in 
fact the right sold by pipelines to shippers. These are pipeline rights sold in order to pay for the 
infrastructure investment and operation. In this respect, withdrawal rights are quite different under the 
two carriage systems.  
We want to highlight that; Withdrawal rights under contract carriage are stronger than under 
common carriage. This is the key difference between the two carriage systems. In the common 
carriage system, the withdrawal right is assigned but it is not guaranteed. Hence, withdrawal rights 
assigned to a user do not mean the exclusion of another shipper’s right of use. The European principle 
of ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ is one of the main pieces to bring together the different EU network regulations. 
This may be put in terms of who defines the services, or who defines the operational meaning of 
withdrawal right. Common carriages are based on defining services by often homogeneous rules 
(central authority). In contract carriages, the definition of the service is in the hand of pipelines and 
shippers. 
The differences in management rights may be viewed as a consequence of the previous differences 
in withdrawal rights. As the operation depends on the characteristics of the services sold, the decision 
regarding the infrastructure management is a pipeline right in both systems. Pipeline decisions, 
however, are constrained by the withdrawal rights required by shippers. In common carriages, 
management rights are limited by the common rules regarding the capacity. This includes rules 
ranging from congestion management to the amount of line-pack use
7
. On the other hand, in contract 
carriage system, the pipeline management rights are restricted by the characteristics of shippers’ 
withdrawal contracts. From the incentive point of view, restricted management rights under common 
                                                     
6
 The common usage of property right expression has been quite close of right of alienation. “In much of the economic 
literature, private property is defined as equivalent to alienation. Property rights systems that do not contain the right of 
alienation are considered to be ill-defined. Further, they are presumed to lead to inefficiency since property-rights holders 
cannot trade their interests on a improved resources system for other resources, nor can someone (Ostrom (2005), page 
24). 
7
 One example of this kind of rules constraining the amount of line-pack that can be used by the pipeline operator can be 
seen in the UK.  
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carriage decrease the incentive to improve the operation efficiency
8
. In contract carriage systems, the 
main incentive to improve infrastructure management is the possibility to offer more (or more 
valuated) withdrawal services. Hence the incentive of management rights is limited to the profitable 
efficiency improvement. 
In liberalized markets, the network does not have full rights because of its asset specificity does not 
allow easy transactions of network services. But such services may be more or less flexible, and the 
way to offer them may be more or less competitive. Actually, the rights to use and offer services 
significantly change depending on the carriage system used. Goods with poorly defined rights increase 
transaction costs decreasing the efficiency of markets in allocating available resources
9
. Thus, it is 
important to underline the differences between the transactions of the assets and the transactions of the 
rights to use the network infrastructures. 
4.2 Comparing EU and US carriage systems 
We now turn to emphases practical implications of the choice of carriage system. The two typical 
cases are the EU (common carriage) and US (contract carriage).  
Common carriage must be distinguished from Third Party Access (TPA), according to Newbery 
(2002). The European Commission defined TPA in 1992 “as regime providing for an obligation, to the 
extent that there is capacity available, on companies operating transmission and distribution networks 
for....”, (EC, 1992), emphasis added.  
Under these terms, TPA is only a non-discriminatory rule, which can considered here as open 
access rules (i.e. all the shippers have the right to be served according to the contracted service). In 
other words, the original TPA rules could only impose the obligation to the pipeline owner to offer 
capacity if there is available capacity, or if it has not been allocated before. These non-discriminatory 
rules in the use of pipelines are a policy trend observed in all countries, which went through a 
liberalization process
10
. 
These initial open access rules can be observed as compatible with the legal framework of both 
contract and common carriers. The differences between the two concern the definition of available 
capacity.  
This dimension of the choice of carriage system was explained in section 0 by means of simple 
games. This section has discussed so far the implementation of the carriage systems in terms of 
property rights. The definition of property rights, and especially of withdrawal rights, implies the 
definition of who is deciding on the possible use of network resources. This in turn was the source of 
different incentive systems in the games described in section 3.  
From this standpoint, the legal frameworks for contract and carriage systems define the 
implementation of TPA. Put it differently, even with TPA, it is of critical importance the definition of 
available capacity, and the definition of available capacity depends on the definition of property rights. 
So whether the carriage system is identified with the situation of the game in section 0 or the one in 
section 0 ultimately depends on the definition of property rights. In other words, the set of incentives 
implemented by contract and common carriages depends on who is deciding on the services offered, 
                                                     
8
 In the UK some regulatory incentives to increase operational efficiency have been utilized, and they try to recover the 
economic incentives to improve operational efficiency. 
9
 The works of Demsetz (1968), Cheung (1970; Barzel (1982), Williamson (1991b) and Libecap (1986) and Libecap 
(2008) provide the foundations to understand the relationship between transaction cost and property rights theory.  
10
 As noted by Kotlowski (2007), the definition of Third Party Access does not provide a clear definition of a TPA right. 
However, the underlying concept in the text of the Directives could be that TPA corresponds with an obligation to 
contract and a duty to perform. However, no definition contracts and duties was clearly established. 
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and that is defined by the definition of property rights. In contract carriages, the available capacity 
depends on the occupation of pipelines according to contract clause characteristics. In common 
carriages, the available capacity depends on the possible flow regarding regulated criteria.  
The definition of a set of rules of network use has gradually become the model adopted by the EU 
countries, and recommended by EU institutions such as ERGEG and ACER
11
. The regulation under 
‘common carriage’ has led to the homogenization of the services offered. The common carriage 
system actually offers similar services to all shippers and allocates capacity with ex ante priority rules 
(as defined in our examples in section 0). Hence, as we pointed out in section 0, if users’ profiles are 
similar, it is feasible to find a common set of rules that, applied to the group of users, allow an 
efficient management of resources. 
Under the US contract carriage; we observe a relatively large amount of contract types. This in turn 
allows different flexibility degrees and flexibility types. Network services consider line-pack 
utilization, nomination scheduling, and geographical localization. Furthermore, we observe unbundled 
flexibility services, such as loan and parking services. Moreover, flexibility services had not been 
offered just by network operators, but also third parties, as traders managing infrastructure portfolios, 
storage or LNG regasification owners.
12
 Thus, contract carriages imply situations that were described 
by the game with negotiation in section 3.3 (this game may also represent market carriages).  
5. Rules for the use of infrastructures: a key element in the investment dynamics 
The previous section has shown that the allocation of property rights (especially withdrawal rights) 
defines who decides on the network rules. In this regard, we showed in section 3 that the definition of 
the network rules characterizes the game that network users will be playing (and therefore the gas 
market output). The conclusion of the analysis is network resource allocation is in general more 
efficient when network rules are set through systems of contracts.  
In that view, the system of property rights affects the outcome of the gas market. We will show in 
this section that property rights definition is also at the core of the network investment decision. 
Therefore, property rights affect, besides present market outcomes, future possibilities for network use 
and thus future market outcomes.  
5.1 Network rules and investment decisions  
Regardless how the network is planned, infrastructure investment decisions depend on the expected 
demand of transmission services, minus the transmission services already available (the services that 
the installed infrastructure may offer). The analysis of the available services (or the services that may 
be offered by the installed infrastructure) is thus an important step to define the investment that will be 
necessary to face the forecasted demand. But the available services, as we described in the first 
sections of this paper, are the result of the existent infrastructures plus the rules of use. And the 
definition of network rules depends in turn on the carriage system. As the carriage system defines the 
property rights associated with the infrastructure, the carriage system defines the decision set of 
players regarding existent infrastructure (figure 1).  
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 A current example is the discussion looking for homogenous EU congestion management and capacity allocation rules, 
ACER (2011b) and ACER (2011a) . 
12
 Concerning the pipeline contracts in the USA and Canada, the settlement of arrangements between pipelines and users 
instead of formal regulatory process has been underlined. “In general, the settlements have better reflected the actual 
preferences of the customers and the companies, unconstrained by the formal regulatory process. The settlements have 
also been characterized by flexibility, variety, a wide scope, innovation and learning, as some legal scholars have noted”, 
(Littlechild (2009) page, 17). 
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Figure 1: Multilevel Rules Incentives 
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Source: Author elaboration, based on Ostrom (2005) and Koontz (2003). 
Investment in gas infrastructure involves decisions on the type of investment, in addition to the 
amount of investment. Gas network are made up of many pieces, and the choice on those pieces 
depends on the use the players will make of the network. In this context, investment decisions are 
largely affected by the expectation of future needs for network services. Therefore, if players are 
constrained in the use of the network, network investments will be constrained as well. This creates a 
lock-in equilibrium, hiding relevant characteristics of the network use
13
.  
Open access under contract carriage actually has the capacity to inform players of the shippers’ 
preferences. In the US case, we have observed network development very different from what the 
theory of regulated monopoly forecasted. Experience with contract carriages indicates that competition 
led to gas price convergence in the network, eliminating pockets of non-responsive and possibly 
monopolistic prices, and integrating markets. Flexible transport services create the functional paths 
and they are assembled in response to prices and arbitrage opportunities, Walls (2008). 
The previous analysis may be interpreted from the viewpoint of the games of section 3.2. We 
showed that the use of the network depended on the definition of the network rules. Moreover, we 
showed that for some network rules, the equilibrium obtained was not welfare-efficient. In such 
situation, if the network planner has to forecast the future use of the network, she will not have signals 
of the most efficient use of the network, and thus she will not be able to undertake the investments 
corresponding to the efficient use of the network. On the contrary, the game with negotiation in 
section 3.3 gave allowed obtaining the equilibrium with the efficient use of the network. Hence, the 
efficient investment was possible. Thus, we can perceive that the choice of the carriage system have 
dynamic implications: First, the carriage system impacts on the use of infrastructure and on amount of 
available services; second, the carriage system has an incentive impacts on the investment decision 
and thus define the available capacity in the next periods.  
5.2 Delimiting the room for innovation  
A priori efficiency of the infrastructures regulated by common carriages may be challenged here on 
two issues: the first one is the asymmetry of information concerning the demand profile of the 
consumers and the second its on is ability to foster service innovation..  
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 An example of the previous lock-in equilibrium is the investment in storage facilities in the Spanish and Italian systems. 
Both systems are characterized by common carriers, and thus by network uses constrained by ex-ante rules. The former 
system specifies LNG regasification to be the provider of flexibility. The Spanish investment shows an unparalleled 
preference for LNG terminals. On the other hand, the Italian network rules specify underground storage as the main 
provider of flexibility. Likewise, the Italian investment shows an unparalleled preference for underground storage, (M. 
Hallack, 2011). 
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Comparing the result of flexibility services’ development in gas industries through the optic of 
make-or-buy decisions
14
, we can observe an example where the adaptability of make decisions may 
also generate negatives outcomes. In this case, the regulatory internalization of flexibility services (or 
the adaptability to the new demand conditions) has actually blocked the promotion of service 
innovation. In other words, the theory has emphasized the higher adaptability of hierarchic forms of 
coordination (e.g. s regulation
15
) in order to deal with changes in the environment. And, actually, in 
our cases studies, we observed how regulatory coordination has driven network operators to adapt to 
the new gas demand providing flexibility services. However, the regulatory adaptability has a cost, 
because there is no guarantee that the new situation accommodation is actually the best solution.  
Rate-of-return regulation is a clear example of that. One may consider that it has high potential to 
accommodate to the new situation, as the regulated enterprise (as workers of an enterprise) will follow 
any command to ‘do this or do that’, Williamson (1991a). Nonetheless, compared to a vertical relation 
in an enterprise, the enterprise in a market environment tends to have feed-back regarding their 
managerial decisions. In the vertical relation of regulators, the evaluation of decisions over regulated 
enterprises is much less clear, and it is often affected by political interactions. 
We showed that the use of infrastructures under common carriages drives investment decisions and 
thus changes the network design. The ‘ex post’ evaluation of network decisions is quite difficult. The 
adaptation process implies that, after any decision is taken, all further decisions will take into account 
the last one. Regulatory adaptability removes possible coordination failures between players in the 
process of adaptation to new situations; in this context the regulatory command actually substitutes the 
need of industry to adapt relying on bilateral agreements. However, as a consequence of the regulatory 
action, there are also constraints on service innovation. In a context of market changes, when 
innovations are more likely to be developed, the possibility of negative outputs associated with 
regulatory interference needs to be carefully taken into account. 
Compared to the USA contract carriage, the EU common carriage is an open access system, but it 
has showed little adaptation to changing circumstances. It has not delivered products with the diversity 
that is required to serve diverse customers, as observed in the USA. The EU flexibility market has not 
innovated. 
6. Conclusion  
We have shown in this paper that the question “who decides the rules from network use“ may be 
viewed as the starting point for the definition of market outcomes. Once the mechanism deciding rules 
is set, the rules define the set of possible incentives. We have shown the role of negotiation “ex-ante”: 
when players negotiate to define the rules for network use, it allows taking into account players’ 
preferences.  
In order to determine who is deciding on the rules, the definition of property rights is central. Put it 
differently, the definition of property rights defines who is defining the rules. And such definition of 
property rights is done in the choice of carriage system. The preferred carriage system in the EU, the 
common carrier, establishes a set of property rights that end up in the definition of “ex-ante” network 
rules. The carriage system implemented in the US, the contract carrier, implies a set of property rights 
that allows the revelation of players’ preferences in the process of defining rules.  
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 Williamson (1991a) has discussed the coordination mechanisms features of market procurement (buy) and internal 
procurement (make). He has emphasized that these coordination mechanisms actually have different features regarding 
adaptability, incentives and control instruments. 
15
  “Rate-of-return regulation and internal organization are analogous institutions in that both employ low-powered 
incentives and relatively flexible administrative decision processes rather than courts to dissolve disputes”, Crocker & 
Masten (1996), page 24, note 20). 
Michelle Hallack and Miguel Vazquez 
14 
We have also shown that the definition of the game that network users play is determines not only 
the present market outcome, but also the future development of the network. Therefore, the definition 
of property rights, which in turn defines the game, is a central element in the dynamics of the industry. 
When the property rights correspond to a common carrier, the set of rules do not take into account 
players’ preferences. Therefore, the set of “ex-ante” rules defines a lock-in.  
Moreover, the role of innovation is significantly reduced when players’ preferences are not 
adequately represented in the investment decisions. The carriage systems defining the players who 
define the set of services possibilities provided by network delimit the role of players to innovate. The 
hierarchical coordination tends to induce less innovation, especially in the absence of competitive 
threat. With the contract carriers, where interested players are the mains responsible to settle the 
network use rules, the flexibility requirements drove service innovation. With common carriers, where 
the rules was mainly defined according to an ‘exogenous’ third party, the network rules did not 
respond to the new conditions.  
Given a complex system and a dynamic world, centralized investment decisions on gas transport 
networks do not seem the best coordination mechanism to face a liberalized gas market with 
heterogeneous and mobile preferences. 
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